Introduction
Most of the conversation and consternation about the future of air battle management fails to capture the true crux of the problem: the development of the human capital needed to ensure air superiority. The air battle management professionals (Air Battle Managers [ABMs]), Weapons Directors [WDs], and enlisted aviators) that operate either on-board or within a ground command and control (C2) node cannot be replaced by even the most sophisticated Palantir application. Yet our air battle management professionals are unprepared to combat the tactical problems of yesterday and are woefully underprepared for the future fight. It is a hard pill to swallow for some, but the days of tactical control are over, as the Air Force transitions its force design to a 5th and 4th generation mixed force and peer competitors change the threat baseline environment. Yes, some resources should still be allocated to the “blocking and tackling” of the 4v4, but just like the community moved on from close control in the 2000s, it is time to move on and find our new focus on the continuum of control. That focus must be closing long-range kill chains, managing dynamic targets across multiple domains, and the exploitation of multi-phenomenologies.
The air battle managers of today are unprepared to fight the conflicts of 2025 due to decades of resourcing neglect and divestment. Furthermore, the lack of resourcing has limited the scope and scale of what air battle managers are exposed to and train for every day. The kit used by air battle managers currently does not facilitate training with non-weapon system organic capabilities, or there are insufficient next-generation C2 kits in the field. This was recently highlighted during the Tactical Operations Center-Light (TOC-L) major release 2 prototype announcement, with just 16 of the legacy TOC-L in the field and 40 next-generation to be fielded. No matter if it is an E-3G or a TOC-L kit, the C2 community must expand the non-organic sensor and layered communication training during day-to-day reps and sets. For the remainder of this post, I will spend some time expanding upon the characteristics needed from the few champions that found themselves experimenting with me over the past couple of years within novel C2 structures:
1) The need for layered voice (line-of-sight & satellite-based) and tactical datalink communication expertise,
2) The battle management of long-range kill chains,
3) Sense-making across the spectrum and domains with C2-intelligence teaming.
The Solution
In his post Beyond Replacement, Major Douglas “Opie” Foulk laid out the need for distributed control and a redundant and resilient C2 structure that allows the force to execute the commander’s intent within an acceptable level of risk. I would argue that the operators needed must understand and be able to employ all communication networks available to them. Link 16 and the beyond-line-of-sight (BLOS) protocols that make up some of our common tactical pictures (CTP) are just the beginning. C2 professionals must evolve to leverage the space transport layer’s capabilities in the fight and understand how the air battle manager will utilize this medium to move target and threat data, ensuring an information advantage. The C2 community needs to move past the emphasis on UHF voice and truly focus our training and education on proliferated low-earth orbit communication architectures and other mesh networks. While I do not argue for the air battle management community to build these communication networks at the technical level, we must know how to operationalize them and shape the requirements for redundant and resilient communications so that critical connectivity can be maintained even when air battle managers are operating from an austere island in the Pacific. The upcoming fight may span vast distances, stressing the limitations of radars and radios on tactical C2 platforms. This will render their on-board capabilities insufficient for modern combat, effectively making most organic radar and radios obsolete. So, a robust layered line-of-sight and BLOS communication architecture that can be employed effectively by an air battle management team is the first step to actualizing the air battle management of long-range kill chains.
The ABM career field’s long history of managing sensors, weapons, and fuel uniquely affords the management of the joint force’s long-range kill chains. To do that, the air battle management community must focus training on joint weapons, their effectiveness, and the communication architecture required to get these weapons to end-game. There has been progress in the past couple of years, thanks to the pioneering work Major Nicholas “Smokin” Volz accomplished in the United States Air Force Warfare Center’s Warfighter Integration Office, publishing the initial tactics, techniques, and procedures. The air battle management community must understand not just the air component’s weapons, but also what the other services offer, as well as the timing, tempo, and data requirements for each. Additionally, ABMs and WDs are the individuals who must bridge the non-kinetic community with the kinetic to integrate electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) effects into the larger warfighting effort.
With a larger emphasis on multi-domain operations and the EMS, a more robust C2 and intel teaming construct will unlock the integration needed to answer the tactical problems of 2025. While this is not a new concept, as many of those with JSTARS experience would attest, the expansion of these teaming principles must be explored and eventually capitalized on. The C2 community must develop air battle management competencies to facilitate the exchange of intelligence information, threats, and targeting data between the C2-intel team. There is a requirement for air battle management professionals to understand where information came from, the confidence associated with that source, and the pathways through which to communicate it. The future fight will depend on capabilities operating under both U.S. Code Title 10 (military) and Title 50 (intelligence) authorities, and the first time an operator is exposed to that threat and targeting data cannot be at the commencement of combat operations. This is hard. There are several training barriers that prevent this from being implemented across the combat air force today. However, failing to find avenues to organize, train, and equip the force for modern combat will result in the commander’s intent not being met and/or avoidable risk to the mission and force.
When it comes to maintaining an acceptable level of risk, it is also important for C2 platforms to break from previous dependences on their own organic surveillance volumes when conducting a mission. The use of non-organic sensors must feel just as natural as using your own, and, in some cases, it should be normal to never use an on-board sensor or co-located sensor for the duration of a mission. But to do that, we must also trust information provided by non-organic sources. Operators will not trust unless they understand where the information, track, or data came from and how latent it is. The air battle management teams of tomorrow will look different from yesterday’s, and every theater and crisis will also differ. That is okay. Modulation, flexibility, and maneuver will be crucial versus a peer competitor, and as new platforms come online, air battle managers will have to continue to adapt – quickly.
Whether it is an E-7A, G550 with an array, CRC, or BCC, the simple fact will hold true: those platforms will only be as lethal as the humans operating them. The three focus areas mentioned above will prepare our C2 warfighters for today’s conflicts, but they do not diminish the other air battle management functions that air battle managers remain responsible for, even if most in the fighter business consider them “admin.” Airspace management, surveillance, information management, and force management are still vital bills we must pay. It is an exciting time in the C2 business as vendors are constantly attempting to solve everything from artificial intelligence/machine learning (AI/ML) to enabling air battle management to finally address cross-domain solutions to bridging several networks onto one or two screens, and everything in between. The Air Force needs capable air battle managers to be placed in front of those operating consoles to unleash the human-machine teaming concepts that make it to the field. To do that, we must look at our syllabi and training pipelines and ask the hard questions: are we doing something only because we have always done it this way?
Conclusion
The multi-domain battle management nodes that are being experimented with will eventually come with a manning bill that only C2 professionals can pay. The community should have started years ago, adjusting training to better produce the C2 warfighters that our nation requires, but limitations persist due to fighting with a kit that was designed in the Cold War. C2 professionals must think differently, using outdated kit until new capabilities are delivered, while also exploring novel technology and applications. The C2 community must allocate additional resources and capital to teach across the spectrum and waveforms of available communication architectures, as well as how to operationalize them. Understanding joint long-range kill chains and their intricacies requires time and dedication to ensure valid employment. Furthermore, the C2 and intel teaming that the next conflict will necessitate will demand the human capital of both our specialties to maximize joint force capabilities. The C2 community is undergoing a period of change, marked by considerable uncertainty, but it is clear that the air battle management operators’ expertise needs to grow and be unleashed.
Maj Andre “Grinder” Hebert, USAF, is a Master Air Battle Manager and currently a student at the U.S. Army’s Command and General Staff College. He most recently was the Chief, Command & Control of the USAFWC’s Warfighter Integration Office and a USAFWS instructor.
Photo by Pok Rie on Pexels
The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Air Force, Department of Defense, or U.S. government.
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