Air combat is evolving, and the future appears bleak for legacy command and control air battle management (C2ABM) platforms such as the E-3G Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) and Control and Reporting Center (CRC). Much has been written about this bleak future, which features adversaries with clear and urgent ambitions, backed by impressive new counter-air and counter-land weaponry, and a U.S. Air Force that is older than ever and may face sustainment challenges fighting as an “away” team. Specifically for C2ABM, there has been a pervasive narrative that the E-3G is obsolete and urgently needs to be replaced by the E-7. At the same time, the TPS-75-equipped CRC is similarly characterized as irrelevant in light of beyond-line-of-sight (BLOS) C2ABM units, such as the Battle Management and Control Squadrons (BMCSs), or units equipped with Tactical Operation Center-Light (TOC-L) kits.
But is this true? Is the legacy C2ABM architecture really so decrepit that it must be wholly replaced to be of value in future conflict? Perhaps by exploring some psychological and cultural biases that underpin the urgent desire to move on from legacy C2ABM systems, some of these apparent “truths” can be questioned and a more realistic future can be envisioned – one in which there is an enduring and critical role for legacy systems such as the E-3G and CRC, regardless of whether new technologies are also added to the inventory.
Biases & Narratives
Technological Solutionism
The U.S. Air Force faces a problem: it must be prepared to prevent increasingly sophisticated adversaries from achieving rapid victories if they choose to engage in military adventurism that U.S. national leadership deems at odds with the national interest. The solution: technological overmatch. Is this truly the only, or even best, solution?
Modern Western societies tend to favor designed or engineered solutions to problems and prefer to solve them through technological means. This tendency is not inherently bad, but it can reduce the likelihood that individuals or organizations will seek non-technical solutions to emerging problems, especially when they are aware of an emerging technology that might be useful. In the context of the problem above, more modern fighter, strike, and C2ABM platforms have been identified as critical solutions. Emerging C2ABM technologies such as the E-7, which has been employed by U.S. allies since 2009, and cloud-based command and control (CBC2) or Air Battle Management System (ABMS) are well known. They are touted as solving tactical challenges in areas where legacy C2ABM platforms might struggle. For many, demanding immediate implementation of these emergent technologies will “feel” like the only sure way to address the daunting military challenges of the future – but are these the panacea that they are sometimes made out to be?
Excess Optimism over Future States
Technological solutions are rarely the panacea that they are sometimes made out to be, and there is no particular reason to suspect that emergent C2ABM platforms are likely to be an exception. Still, it is tempting to consider a future state in which the E-7 has supplanted the E-3G, CRC units deploy with robust BLOS sensing and communication capabilities, and AI capabilities abound, and to imagine how that future could enable C2ABM practitioners to expertly manage air battles to maximize friendly combatants’ ability to kill and survive against an increasingly modern threat, ultimately leading to decisive victory in future conflicts. This temptation to view future technology as a sort of panacea stems from the human tendency to overestimate future benefits while underestimating future drawbacks or challenges – a phenomenon described succinctly by the colloquialism “the grass is always greener on the other side.” To be sure, emergent C2ABM capabilities are objectively more capable than their predecessors, but like any new technology, they will be found to be imperfect as operators uncover each system’s unique capabilities and limitations, which must be exploited and mitigated, respectively.
Hype and Burning Platform Narratives
Perhaps emerging C2ABM platforms are well equipped to succeed in future conflicts – but does this necessarily mean that legacy platforms are incapable? If one were to believe the hype surrounding the recent fight for E-7 funding, they might think so. This is partly due to the effects of the inflated expectations stage of the Gartner Hype Cycle, which shows that hype surrounding emerging technology starts with an innovation (e.g., the E-7), leads to inflated expectations, some of which would render existing technology (e.g., the E-3) obsolete, shifts to disillusionment as interest wanes due to product delays or the uncovering of limitations, and ultimately stabilizes at a realistic plateau once the technology is widely adopted and understood.
Furthermore, E-7 advocates frequently cite the E-3’s inadequacy as a primary argument for the urgent need for the U.S. to acquire E-7s, adopting a burning platform narrative. This approach was undeniably effective as a marketing strategy, but its success in securing congressional funding for the E-7 does not necessarily lend it credibility in truth. Perhaps two things can be true: emergent C2ABM platforms, such as the E-7 or CBC2-enabled centers, may be more advanced than their predecessors, while legacy C2ABM platforms, such as the E-3G or CRC, are also still capable of administering tactical C2 and air battle management effects.
Indeed, the E-7 brings meaningful improvements, including automation, better fuel efficiency and range, reduced maintenance demands, and enhanced multi-domain integration potential. These advantages justify its acquisition and eventual primacy in the inventory, though acquisition timelines, integration challenges, and the reality of phased fielding means legacy platforms will shoulder the majority of the C2ABM burden for at least the next decade, making their continued optimization not just nostalgic, but militarily essential.
Outcomes
It is important to dispel the misconception that legacy platforms are incapable, as this belief carries several undesirable side effects.
First, humans are not predisposed to expend effort unnecessarily. Should the C2ABM or larger air dominance community accept as fact that legacy platforms are irrelevant in modern conflict, individuals within these communities will become less motivated to expend effort to improve these systems through small-scale system improvements, imagination in operational test environments, and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) development and refinement. Such a lack of human investment risks truly rendering legacy C2ABM platforms obsolete, as any warfighting community that fails to innovate and adjust TTP to account for the ever-evolving conflict landscape will quickly become ill-postured to contribute positively in any future conflict. Further, without confident platform advocates, legacy C2ABM platforms may be underutilized by operational air planners who do not understand the conditions under which these platforms remain useful. Finally, C2ABM practitioners who believe their platform is inadequate compared to contemporaries are likely to view their daily efforts to use it as meaningless or irrelevant. This can lead individuals to lose motivation to continue pouring effort into the current system, as that effort may appear wasted once the platform’s replacement is fielded, and can also lead individuals holding these beliefs to feel demoralized, which can have a negative effect on readiness and performance.
Mitigation
To avoid the potential outcomes outlined above, C2ABM practitioners and advocates should pause, reflect upon, and attempt to avoid the biases outlined even further above.
- To mitigate technological solutionism, C2ABM practitioners can instead focus on adapting, perfecting, and practicing TTP that employs current systems for maximum impact in the current environment. For example, pursue low-cost, high-payoff upgrades such as software patches for improved data fusion, integration of commercial satellite communications for better BLOS reach, or refined crew coordination procedures that squeeze additional performance from existing E-3G and CRC hardware.
- To remain grounded in the face of excess optimism over future states, individuals can pause and recall that emerging technologies are not without their problems, and likely will take longer than anticipated to be fully fielded – legacy systems will, for better or worse, continue to make up the preponderance of the U.S. Air Force’s C2ABM capability for quite some time. Operators may be wise to hold off on considering how these future platforms will change the nature of C2ABM until such time as they become qualified on these platforms.
- To avoid the demoralization that can come from feeling trapped on a “burning platform,” individuals should consider the goals of those who put out these narratives. They should temper their acceptance of the message accordingly – perhaps the recent bashing of the E-3G is more of a marketing ploy (albeit a successful one) than a grounded analysis of the platform’s true capabilities, especially when crewed by dedicated and innovative professionals.
Conclusion
We exist in an exciting time for the C2ABM community, in the midst of a technological transition from 1970s- and 1980s-era platforms to platforms designed in the 2000s and beyond. While emerging platforms offer clear advances, legacy systems like the E-3G and TPS-75 CRC continue to deliver reliable, mature tactical C2 in many scenarios. For instance, during large-force employment exercises, such as Red Flag or the Bamboo Eagle series in recent years, E-3G crews have consistently provided robust air battle management, deconfliction, and real-time cueing, even against modern threats, when paired with Link-16 participants and updated TTP. The CRC’s ground-based TPS-75 and established integration with theater air control elements likewise remain valuable in contested environments where airborne assets face higher risk or where persistent, wide-area coverage is needed without relying on satellite-dependent BLOS links. These enduring strengths demonstrate that capability is not binary – legacy platforms are not “obsolete” but rather will be complementary during the multi-decade transition to next-generation systems.
It is important that C2ABM experts do not become so swept up in the future that they neglect the present. Future platforms will come and will no doubt be great leaps forward; however, they have not yet replaced the legacy systems. So long as these legacy systems exist, they should be used to maximum effect, and their operators should take pride in their contributions to the warfighting effort. By investing thoughtfully in both optimizing legacy systems today and the prudent, measured adoption of new capabilities tomorrow, the C2ABM community can ensure seamless continuity, sustained readiness, and enhanced effectiveness throughout this multi-generational transition.
Lt Col Douglas “Opie” Foulk, USAF, is a Senior Air Battle Manager, currently on staff as a Legislative Affairs Officer at the United Stated Indo-Pacific Command. He previously served in various positions across multiple E-3G AWACS squadrons.
The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Air Force, Department of Defense, or U.S. government.
Gartner Hype Cycle graphic by Jeremykemp at English Wikipedia, CC BY-SA 3.0, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=10547051
Feature image credit: U.S. Air Force photo by Cynthia Griggs
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