Introduction
As China’s military modernization accelerates, threatening U.S. interests in the Indo-Pacific, a troubling trend among policymakers and analysts risks undermining America’s military edge: the deliberate or tacit abandonment of air superiority, a strategic necessity to deter and defeat the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Proposals to shift intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) to vulnerable space platforms, embrace “air denial” over dominance, reduce fifth-generation fighter procurement, and abandon replacement airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) aircraft, such as the Boeing E-7, reflect flawed reasoning. Some argue air superiority is an “illusion” against advanced air defenses, while others claim denial through dispersed basing and cheaper systems suffices for deterrence. These miscalculations could cede the skies to the PLA or other competent competitors, inviting strategic failure in future conflicts. Israel’s Operation Rising Lion in June 2025, with 1,500 sorties dismantling over 900 targets in Iran’s nuclear and military infrastructure, proved air superiority’s decisive edge. Using stealth F-35Is, cyber tools, and electronic warfare, Israel deterred aggression without ground entanglements. The U.S. must heed this lesson to counter China’s growing threat.
The Stakes in the Indo-Pacific
China’s rapid military buildup, including sixth-generation fighters, hypersonic missiles, and advanced anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) systems, poses an unprecedented challenge to the U.S. armed forces. In a Taiwan Strait conflict, the PLA could leverage its numerical advantage in AEW&C platforms, estimated at over 50 modern aircraft compared to the U.S. Air Force’s aging fleet of 16 E-3G AWACS, paired with modern fighters and other counter-air systems to dominate the air domain and support amphibious invasions. Airborne Moving Target Indicator (AMTI) data, which tracks moving targets via radar, is critical for situational awareness but is insufficient as a force multiplier without human air battle managers. Platforms like the E-3G AWACS enable real-time coordination of fighters, collaborative combat aircraft (CCA), and naval air assets to penetrate A2/AD bubbles. AMTI informs; battle management directs. Conflating the two, as some budget-driven proposals do, risks leaving U.S. forces blind and uncoordinated in contested skies. Yet, some argue air superiority is outdated, favoring denial strategies that fail to meet China’s challenge
The Enduring Need for Air Superiority
Air superiority is still the key to winning, but China’s advanced capabilities raise the stakes. Today, Ukraine’s stalemate illustrates the peril of contested skies: neither side’s air forces dominate, resulting in grinding attrition. The U.S. Air Force faces its own challenges, with pilots logging just 12 hours monthly, down from 20 pre-1991, due to budget constraints and aging aircraft. Integrating non-kinetic tools, like cyber and electronic warfare, with kinetic strikes is essential, but CCAs and autonomous systems, while promising, cannot yet replace human judgment in combat’s chaos. The U.S. armed forces should not endeavor to replicate the Ukrainian stalemate born of a strategy of air denial rather than one of air superiority.
Rebutting Air Denial Arguments
Despite air superiority’s proven value, some argue that it is outdated, favoring denial strategies that fail to meet China’s offensive challenge. Advocates of air denial, drawing from observations of the Ukraine conflict or citing cost concerns, argue that layered defenses, cheap small unmanned aerial systems (sUAS), and dispersed basing can deter China without the expense of air superiority. The Atlantic Council claims advanced air defenses render superiority an “illusion,” advocating denial to contest the “air littoral” with unmanned systems. Similarly, Bremer and Greico argue that dispersed operations and low-cost platforms can deny China air control, avoiding the high costs of fifth-generation fighters and air battle management systems. These perspectives misapply Ukraine’s defensive context and underestimate China’s offensive capabilities. Ukraine’s mutual air denial has prolonged attrition without decisive outcomes, allowing Russia to grind forward. In a Taiwan scenario, denial alone would cede initiative, enabling the PLA to seize key terrain before U.S. forces mobilize. Dispersed basing, while resilient, lacks the reach to disrupt PLA command nodes, supply lines, airfields, or amphibious operations across the Strait. On the contrary, Israel’s strikes, integrating stealth, cyber, and human-led control, prove superiority enables proactive offense, not just defense. Applying these lessons to the Pacific where China is fielding hypersonic missiles and anti-satellite weapons, which could cripple space-based assets with a single nuclear detonation, a layered approach to air superiority is non-negotiable.
The E-7’s Critical Role
The Boeing E-7 AEW&C is indispensable for a fight against a modern adversary such as China. Beyond relaying AMTI, its Multi-Role Electronically Scanned Array (MESA) radar provides a survivable, 360-degree perspective, enabling air battle managers to orchestrate air battles and air operations in real-time, guiding F-35s through A2/AD zones. Space-based ISR, while valuable, is vulnerable to China’s anti-satellite capabilities. Ground-based radars are limited by terrain and horizon constraints, unable to match the E-7’s elevated flexibility. The Navy’s E-2D Hawkeye, designed for carrier-based operations, lacks the endurance for air superiority missions across the Indo-Pacific’s vast distances. Hesitation to fund E-7, driven by budget pressures, ignores these realities and undermines deterrence. Delaying procurement risks leaving the U.S. without a modern replacement for the E-3G, whose maintenance costs have surged in the past decade.
The Future: F-35 and NGAD
The U.S. must also accelerate F-35 and Next-Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) programs, which will be complemented by the E-7. With 82% of USAF fighters being aging fourth-generation jets from the 1980s, F-35’s stealth and sensor fusion are the “cost of entry” into A2/AD zones. The F-35’s ability to fuse onboard sensor data and share it securely across networks mirrors Israel’s F-35I success in Rising Lion. NGAD, pairing crewed fighters with CCAs, represents the future of survivable, connected airpower. A Royal Australian Air Force exercise demonstrated this, with an E-7A operator controlling two MQ-28 Ghost Bat CCAs to neutralize an airborne target, showcasing the E-7’s potential role in directing autonomous systems alongside manned assets. In a Taiwan scenario, E-7s could guide NGAD and CCAs to outmaneuver PLA defenses, with human oversight adapting to dynamic threats. Budget hawks advocating cheaper fourth-generation upgrades risk a “death spiral” for fifth-gen programs.
Policy Recommendations
The path forward is clear. First, Congress must restore and accelerate E-7 funding, prioritizing rapid deployment to replace the E-3G by the mid-2030s. The Pentagon should increase F-35 production to 72 jets annually, addressing supply chain bottlenecks that have delayed deliveries by close to 30% for 2023. Fully funding NGAD, including its CCA component, is also essential to counter China’s sixth-generation advancements, which are expected to enter service by 2035. Beyond procurement, operations, and maintenance investments, training investments are necessary to reverse the decline in pilot hours and restore readiness. Non-kinetic capabilities, cyber and electronic warfare, require continued dedicated funding. Finally, U.S. warfighting practitioners and advocates at all levels must champion the E-7 and NGAD, rejecting shortsighted cuts that prioritize near-term savings over long-term security.
The conflict in Ukraine demonstrates how a lack of air superiority invites stalemate, or worse. Israel’s Operation Rising Lion demonstrates that integrated airpower employed to achieve air superiority can secure victory and deter aggression. U.S. failure to invest in the E-7, F-35, CCA, and NGAD programs invites catastrophe against China’s growing capabilities. Air superiority isn’t optional; it’s America’s security foundation, because since the air domain’s emergence, no war has been won without controlling the skies.
Photo by Guy Seela on Pexels
Lt Col Grant “SWAT” Georgulis, USAF, is a Master Air Battle Manager and currently assigned as the Deputy Chief of C2 Inspections as part of the Headquarters NORAD and NORTHCOM Inspector General team. He most recently finished a year-long Air Force National Defense Fellowship at The Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies for the academic year 2024-2025. He entered the Air Force in 2007 through the ROTC program at Texas State University–San Marcos. Lt Col Georgulis has served on a combatant command component staff, was an Air Force Weapons School instructor, and graduated from the Naval War College’s College of Naval Command and Staff and Air University’s School of Advanced Air and Space Studies. He previously commanded an E-3G Squadron, the 965 Airborne Air Control Squadron, at Tinker Air Force Base, Oklahoma.
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, or Department of the Air Force.
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