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Make it Make Sense: Air Battle Managers in the Age of Informationized Warfare

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Introduction

The character of war continues to evolve, trending increasingly toward what Chinese doctrine coins as informationized war—defined by an emphasis on the integration of advanced information and communications technology to shape the battlefield and secure decisive advantages. To adapt to this shift in war’s character, the Department of War (DOW) has developed the strategic concept sense, make sense, act as a means to gain operational advantage. Consequently, the Department of the Air Force (DAF) has focused operations, activities, and investments on robust and resilient communications/connectivity and on overcoming the sensing gap, a term used to refer to perceived shortfalls in the ability to accurately characterize the battlespace in a highly contested environment. However, inherent in the process of sensing/collecting and rapidly distributing relevant data/information is a space—what the DOW refers to as make sense—where information is analyzed, interpreted, and prioritized on a tactically relevant timeline. Air Battle Managers (ABMs) are uniquely suited to excel in the make sense space but will need to continue to hone their skillsets to handle the challenges presented by the continued evolution of war’s character.

Increasing Volumes of Information

As case studies from Operation Anaconda demonstrate, information overload can play a significant role in the outcome of an engagement, battle, operation, or campaign. Therefore, an obvious challenge resulting from warfare’s continued shift toward an informationized character is presented by the expected increase in the volume of information available and its potential to overwhelm an Airman. Moreover, there is no guarantee that available information will be pristine—often, information that is received is outdated, incomplete, or inaccurate. Consequently, to thrive in the make sense space, ABMs must sharpen their ability to sort wheat from chaff in a larger volume of available information and to then act upon this information on a tactically relevant timeline while not succumbing to information overload.

Increasing Information Exchange Mediums

As the volume of available information increases, the number of information exchange mediums is also likely to increase. In recent years, the DAF has publicly expressed its desire to enhance and expand its data pathways. Consequently, ABMs must possess intimate knowledge of communications plans and must grasp the implications contained within (i.e., are there entities or nodes who will not have access to specific information due to their own limitations and how else will these participants receive needed information?). When communications plans are discussed, ABMs must advocate for or create specificity in these plans. Should a planner say something to the effect of post it in chat, ABMs should immediately clarify who communicates what message through which medium and should ensure a shared mental model amongst participants. Unfortunately, as the number of information exchange mediums increases, so does the opportunity for error. Therefore, ABMs must sharpen their ability to understand when something is wrong and fix it; for example, if an expected communication needed for decision-making is not delivered at the expected time (i.e., perhaps the message was posted in a wrong chat window), ABMs should help identify the mistake and facilitate a fix.

Increasing Participants and Complexity

As war continues to evolve toward the informationized, advancements in related technology have driven the United States military toward increasingly emphasizing Jointness and multi-domain operations. Consequently, the continued evolution of warfare’s character requires more varied participants to become involved in any given operation. In keeping with Brooks’s Law, an increase in the number of participants will increase complexity, and, as Clausewitz notes, an increase in complexity increases the potential for failure in war. Therefore, ABMs must step in to help manage this complexity and bring order to chaos. Long-hailed as master integrators, ABMs must continue to enhance their ability to coordinate diverse assets to the level of scale required for victory in informationized war.

Errors in Cognition

As Clausewitz notes, war is a chaotic and human endeavor. It is ultimately fought by human beings with all their talents, triumphs, passions, and flaws. Therefore, it is subject to emotions, personalities, flawed reasoning, and any number of forces that could cause even the best laid plans to go awry. Perception errors and cognitive biases possess the potential to have negative impacts upon mission planning and execution, and as the rapid development of information technology continues, there is risk such development may outpace the human brain’s ability to adapt to it. Consequently, ABMs must understand the role heuristics (or mental shortcuts), anchoring, emotional reasoning, and various other cognitive processes play in military decision-making and execution, how such phenomena will be amplified in informationized war, and how such phenomena may be targeted by adversaries seeking decisive advantages. Moreover, ABMs must develop deliberate plans and processes to mitigate these predictable errors to deny these advantages to the adversary.

Automated Systems

Although artificial intelligence/machine learning and concepts such as human-machine teaming show promise and offer the potential for decisive advantages in informationized warfare, these capabilities are still nascent and fallible. Errors in programming/design and false positives/negatives could lead to disaster in conflict. Moreover, programs designed to aid and enhance decision-making are developed in a specific context—at a specific point in time and under specific circumstances—and there is no guarantee such programs will function optimally once context changes occur. As these capabilities continue to mature, ABMs will be crucial in navigating the nuance that automated systems struggle with. Therefore, ABMs must continue to sharpen their own abilities to adapt to change and navigate the gray areas encountered in military operations to be a complementary teammate in a human-machine teaming construct.

Conclusion

When viewed within the context of informationized war, battle management can be considered the conversion of information and data into decisions and actions. The skillsets instilled within ABMs uniquely posture these Airmen to enable the DAF to accomplish the make sense component of the DOW’s sense, make sense, act strategic concept. However, to fully rise to the challenge, ABMs must continue to sharpen and hone their skillsets so they can expand to the scale required to win informationized war.


Lt Col Joshua “Tater” Williams, USAF, is a Senior Air Battle Manager and has served in a variety of Air Force operational, instructional, and staff roles. He is a graduate of the United States Air Force Weapons School, the United States Marine Corps School of Advanced Warfighting, and the United States Marine Corps Command and Staff College.


The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Air Force, Department of Defense, or U.S. government.


Photo by Brett Sayles on Pexels


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