Operation DESERT STORM, the 1991 U.S. military operation that expelled the Iraqi Army from its occupied neighbor, Kuwait, featured a masterful air campaign. This air campaign dismantled Iraqi resistance and quickly set the conditions for U.S. ground forces to fully liberate Kuwait, leading to a decisive U.S. victory after only 42 days of conflict. The air campaign was a success in part because of brilliant planning, robust air dominance & command and control and air battle management (C2ABM) teaming, and certainly because of the various new technologies being employed such as the E-8A Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) C2ABM platform, stealth aircraft, precision guided munitions, and widespread use of the nearly-completed global positioning system (GPS). Perhaps less discussed is the relative permissiveness of the geography (the Iraqi army conquered Kuwait in just 4 hours), the close proximity of friendly sanctuary bases to the conflict airspace, and the U.S. military’s ability to build up forces without interference until such time as it chose to engage its well-set force in conflict.
Given the unprecedented success of the Desert Storm air campaign, it is unsurprising that planners within the U.S. Air Force seek to replicate its success as they prepare for future conflicts. This manifests as a widespread desire to quickly overwhelm the adversary with superior technology and tactics, attack the most critical targets, and, most crucially, force a rapid capitulation. While the appeal of the “quick win” is obvious, history shows that short conflicts are the exception to the protracted conflict rule, and individual belligerents do not get to choose how a conflict, once entered, will evolve. Many factors, including objective setting, force management, and preparation/luck, play a role, and, as the expression goes, the enemy gets a vote. Indeed, there is reason to suspect that many potential U.S. adversaries may not share the U.S. military’s infatuation with short, decisive conflict, and instead will seek to draw the U.S. into a protracted conflict featuring cycles of aggression, exhaustion, and buildup.
C2ABM in Protracted Conflict
The relative impact of modern C2ABM systems would likely be diminished in protracted conflict, especially during periods of exhaustion and buildup. This is not to suggest that there is no benefit to fielding emerging or evolving systems such as the Tactical Operations Center Light (TOC-L), Battle Management and Control Squadrons (BMCSs), E-7 Airborne Early Warning and Control (AEW&C) aircraft, or even the AERIS AEW&C aircraft; rather, the statement merely highlights that these systems will be most impactful at the onset of conflict where both friendly and adversary militaries are employing their most advanced technology in hopes of achieving a rapid decisive victory and/or preventing their opponent from doing the same. Over time, belligerents will be forced to employ whatever remains on hand and may content themselves with merely prolonging the conflict during periods of buildup on either side before undertaking sporadic efforts to “surge” and attain objectives. In the ebbs and flows of protracted conflict, mass matters. This is where legacy C2ABM systems can thrive alongside or in lieu of modern counterparts.
Complementary Efforts
In protracted conflict, legacy ground-based platforms such as the Control and Reporting Center (CRC) may be deployed to provide localized C2ABM around airpower “hubs” to ensure safe recovery of friendly assets returning from patrol or combat, or could be deployed near critical defended infrastructure to support efforts to repel sporadic adversary attacks designed to maintain pressure during periods of buildup. This sort of employment also complements more modern C2ABM platforms, which may leverage the sensor and communications coverage provided by the CRC to enhance their own awareness and span of control. The CRC’s ability to provide localized C2ABM in select locations also enables emergent C2ABM capabilities to be deployed elsewhere, providing more comprehensive sensor, communications, and C2ABM coverage across the theater. These, in turn, can provide data back to enhance CRC operators’ awareness in a mutually beneficial arrangement.
In the air, legacy platforms such as the E-3G Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) can assist in sustaining U.S. warfighting capabilities through expert execution of tactical admin functions such as managing force flow and synchronizing effect timings prior to the initiation of offensive air operations, and especially in facilitating post-strike recovery efforts to ensure combat power is well positioned for follow-on employment. Employing the E-3G for this purpose enables more advanced (and fuel-efficient) platforms, such as the E-7 or AERIS, to be employed further forward in support of combat operations taking place nearer adversary-controlled territory or seas. Similar to the ground-based example, the E-3G and its 5th-generation counterparts can be mutually supportive, as each can augment the other’s awareness of relevant developments in their respective geographic or mission areas. This division of C2ABM functions will be critical in the near- to mid-term, as the U.S. E-7 is expected to be fielded in only very small numbers over the coming years.
All of the functions described above could, of course, be fulfilled by more advanced and, just as crucially, more reliable modern C2ABM platforms. This is the desired end state, should such a time arrive when the U.S. Air Force fields these systems in significant numbers. Meanwhile, friendly and adversary air and counter-air forces have modernized at a more rapid pace than the U.S. C2ABM force, and so modern C2ABM systems will be critical in any quantity. The relative value of these modern systems will be particularly pronounced at the onset of major combat operations or during periods of post-buildup aggression, and their unique capabilities can be best applied to the most challenging mission sets if they are augmented by legacy platforms that can “hold it down” elsewhere, where capable, across all phases of protracted conflict.
Conclusion
Meanwhile, C2ABM advocates and practitioners should avoid idolizing modern platforms as a panacea or “silver bullet” that, if applied correctly, could bring about a swift resolution to major combat operations. Accepting that their C2ABM capabilities are far superior to any currently fielded, these new platforms will nonetheless face inevitable challenges of limited availability due to slow production timelines, malfunctions, and attrition; creative, dedicated, and unexpected adversary action; and even bouts of “bad luck” in the chaos of conflict. Instead, these platforms should be approached and appreciated for what they are: platforms capable of delivering relevant C2ABM effects to a modern force against modern adversaries. Once fielded in sufficient numbers, these platforms can and should supplant their legacy counterparts, but until that point they should be organized, trained, and equipped to handle those mission sets that only they can fulfil while leaving other functions to legacy platforms that will continue make up the preponderance of the force for some years.
Lt Col Douglas “Opie” Foulk, USAF, is a Senior Air Battle Manager, currently on staff as a Legislative Affairs Officer at the United Stated Indo-Pacific Command. He previously served in various positions across multiple E-3G AWACS squadrons.
The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Air Force, Department of Defense, or U.S. government.
Photo by Luis Quintero on Pexels
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