Introduction
The U.S. Air Force is transitioning its airborne command and control (C2) enterprise away from the legacy E-3 and toward a more modern platform; however, recent developments have cast doubt on which specific platform will be procured. Regardless of the outcome of that decision, the U.S. Air Force should not be satisfied with incorporating these new platforms into the existing basing layout. The U.S. Air Force should consider the appropriate size of each squadron, should explore logical basing options without attachment to the status quo, and should consider the organizational structure within which appropriately sized and well-placed airborne C2 air battle management (C2ABM) squadrons should fall. Importantly, next-generation C2ABM platforms should be co-located with the modern fighter aircraft to better hone next-generation air warfare TTP aimed at seizing air superiority.
Force Presentation
Airborne C2ABM units should be organized in a manner that enables flexible employment during conflict, regardless of the platform with which the unit is equipped. First, it is important to establish the size of a C2ABM squadron. In theory, this is not overly complicated: a squadron should include enough aircraft and personnel to sustain a single C2ABM package’s worth of deployed operations indefinitely. Defining what a single command and control package’s worth of deployed operations is supremely important and equally challenging, and this post will make no attempt to define it; however, possible examples may include providing a single-aircraft orbit available within a defined radius of the deployed base for 24 hours a day; providing a single package, perhaps consisting of 2-3 aircraft, for eight hours a day; or some hybrid option that may be complemented by the deployment of a ground-based command and control unit such as a Tactical Operations Center – Light (TOC-L).
Care should be taken to avoid creating oversized squadrons, as doing so may necessitate dividing a single squadron to support disparate taskings. This may strain the support resources assigned to the squadron, which is otherwise co-located, and necessitates the deployment of at least a portion of the squadron without its command element. A right-sized squadron avoids these undesired situations and may be paired with another right-sized squadron if more than one package’s worth of capability is required by a combatant commander. Such a model increases efficiency and maintains flexibility to support both training and contingency operations. Once a squadron composition has been established, it is important to assign these squadrons to appropriate bases to maximize training efficiency and effectiveness, and to avoid wasting limited resources for no gain.
Basing
The U.S. Air Force’s legacy airborne command and control basing construct, which places the majority of the fleet at Tinker AFB, Oklahoma, does not allow command and control aircrews to train or build trust with the external parties with whom they work most closely, namely, fighter and strike aircrews. Further, these crews are disadvantaged because they are not stationed in proximity to part-task training ranges, such as emitter ranges or fighter/bomber ranges used by supported assets. Mitigating these training challenges should be another significant consideration when replacing the legacy E-3 fleet.
Collaborative Training & Debriefing
The most significant training challenge that the current construct of a centrally located C2ABM Wing presents is the lack of collaborative training. Every training sortie consists of four parts: planning, briefing, execution, and debriefing. A geographically separated aircrew cannot plan, brief, or debrief together with the other parties with whom they execute a training sortie. While secure video teleconferences have reduced the requirement to be physically co-located to brief or debrief, this capability is only useful if all parties are available at the appropriate briefing and debriefing times. E-3 crews at Tinker are unable to brief or debrief even by video teleconference, as they are necessarily airborne transiting long distances to or from the training airspace during the briefing and debriefing times of the fighter or strike aircraft with whom they train. This forces crews to debrief without “truth data” and without collaboration, and ultimately requires E-3 instructors to intuit what they “think” was helpful or harmful to the E-3’s training partners during debrief. This prevents E-3 crewmembers from training within a briefing, executing, and debriefing model with external training partners. Forcing crews of any replacement platform to do the same will lead to similar unsatisfactory results. If a similar requirement were levied on our fighter forces, it would be deemed “unacceptable.” It is long past time that C2ABM training and development were afforded the same priority to foster growth and development. Further, airborne C2ABM units should be based in close proximity to nearby training airspaces so that debriefs – collaborative or otherwise – can be accomplished in an appropriate debriefing environment as quickly as possible following the portion of the mission around which the debrief will center.
Team Cohesion
In addition to the reduced training value of each sortie, conducting training sorties from a location far removed from training airspaces and supported units prevents aircrews from building the rapport, camaraderie, and trust that are critical to high-performing teams. Failing to build trust and rapport in peacetime fails to capitalize on a well-established force multiplier that can increase the effectiveness of entire air dominance teams. This benefit to air dominance teams is not purely theoretical; it is demonstrated routinely at Red Flag exercises and at the U.S. Air Force Weapons School. During these events, C2ABM crews and their supported partners go through the familiar cycle of forming, storming, norming, and, in some instances, performing, culminating in air dominance teams executing complex missions together with each platform able to fully trust in – and thus fully leverage the unique capabilities of – the others as a result of bonds formed from consistent close collaboration over the preceding training period. C2ABM aircrews that conduct training sorties while dislocated from the external platforms that they support only have access to such close collaboration sporadically, primarily at the above-named exercises, and are unlikely to seamlessly integrate into high-performing air dominance teams in the event of emergent conflict – an unfortunate time to enter the “forming” phase of team development.
Responsible Resource Stewardship
Finally, from a resources perspective, basing future command and control aircraft at a location far removed from training partners and airspaces is immensely wasteful. This fact appears obvious, but must be addressed because of the status quo: legacy E-3 units are primarily based at Tinker AFB, Oklahoma, which is far removed from training partners and airspaces – a decision at least partially justified by proximity to the depot, which is not a reasonable consideration for a newer aircraft. The training areas that offer valuable training for command and control aircrews include features such as fighter aircraft training or advanced electronic warfare ranges. These features do not exist in the vicinity of Tinker AFB, and instead are found in the vicinity of places such as Hampton, Virginia (1,029 NM from Tinker); Goldsboro, North Carolina (955 NM); Sumpter, South Carolina (853 NM), Destin, Florida (633 NM), Alamogordo, New Mexico (447 NM), and Phoenix, Arizona (731 NM). Taking the averages of these commonly-flown distances offers 774 nautical miles, which, even under favorable assumptions, results in an average of 3.8 hours of wasted transit time during each training sortie. This time could be better spent conducting any number of other professional activities.
Even assuming it is acceptable to waste crewmembers’ time – such an assumption is not unusual in the U.S. military – it should be considered wholly unacceptable to waste the fuel required to sustain flights to faraway training airspaces, and should be considered abhorrent to shorten the lifespan of each airframe by subjecting them to far more hours of operation and associated wear-and-tear than would be required each day if the aircraft were stationed in closer proximity to their training ranges. The drawbacks to basing at Tinker are obvious, as are the benefits to basing nearer training partners and ranges, though dispersing the fleet would require significant initial investment to provide workspaces, maintenance facilities, and training infrastructure (e.g., simulators) at each selected location. The long-term benefit to more lethal air warfare practitioners in the pursuit of air superiority are worth these short-term costs.
Solutions
To address the concerns above, a more distributed basing construct should be pursued. Bases that are home to fourth- and fifth-generation fighter and strike aircraft, such as Langley AFB, VA; Shaw AFB, SC; Seymour-Johnson AFB; NC; or Luke AFB, AZ, should be prioritized locations for future C2ABM units. One possible construct could see a modern operational C2ABM unit fielded at Langley AFB to refine collaborative tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) alongside the F-22s of the 1st Fighter Wing, while another unit could be established at Luke AFB to do the same in close coordination with the F-35A pilots of the 56th Fighter Wing. C2ABM units with less-operational foci, such as the formal training unit and reserve unit, could be retained at a more central location such as Tinker AFB, OK.
Notably, the potential benefits of selecting such a basing arrangement would apply to fighter and strike communities as much as they would to C2ABM crews. All involved in air superiority stand to gain – C2ABM advocates should not be alone in championing these changes.
Organizational Structure
While reasoned basing decisions can have a significant impact on training and force presentation, embedding airborne C2ABM units into supported units would offer still more benefit. If, for example, each fighter wing included the existing complement of fighter or strike aircraft as well as a squadron of airborne C2ABM aircraft and associated crews, continuous team building will occur during peacetime, the benefits of which could be brought to bear immediately if the unit were called upon to engage in conflict. Such a concept is not novel; it has been employed for decades at the 18th Wing in Kadena AB, Japan and 3rd Wing at Elmendorf AFB, Alaska.
Alternative structures, such as retaining an all-controlling C2 Wing under which geographically-separated airborne C2ABM squadrons fall, offer some benefits over adopting the Kadena or Elmendorf models at scale. An overarching airborne C2ABM wing would enable a single entity to synchronize and standardize tactics, training, evaluations, and personnel development across the airborne C2ABM community. Additionally, the existence of an airborne C2ABM wing provides a leadership hub for airborne C2ABM professionals capable of advocating for the unique requirements of airborne C2ABM. Such a structure would require significant coordination and cooperation between the commander of the C2ABM wing and all of the commanders of supported units co-located with airborne C2ABM squadrons (e.g., fighter wing commanders) for myriad considerations, including aligning training timelines, assigning co-trained squadrons to support major exercises, selecting squadrons for deployments, managing Wing-level training and evaluations from afar, etc. To overcome these challenges, far more deference would need to be afforded to squadron commanders to manage their own affairs than is generally afforded within the current model.
Conclusion
The U.S. Air Force is taking steps to modernize its airborne C2ABM enterprise. To fully capitalize upon this modernization effort, the U.S. Air Force should explore not only how to equip the force, but also should reconsider how the force is organized. A distributed basing structure could provide for streamlined force presentation options to be made available to combatant commanders, could improve team cohesion across the air dominance community, could increase the efficiency of daily training, and could increase the reliability and lifespan of each aircraft. The U.S. Air Force should not be satisfied with merely placing new capabilities within the legacy organizational construct, as doing so will prevent the Air Force from fully realizing the potential of whatever new platforms it fields.
Maj Douglas “Opie” Foulk, USAF, is a Senior Air Battle Manager, currently on staff as a Legislative Affairs Officer at the United Stated Indo-Pacific Command. He previously served in various positions across multiple E-3G AWACS squadrons.
The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Air Force, Department of Defense, or U.S. government.
Photo by Lara Jameson on Pexels
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