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Reorienting C2ABM: How the 2025 NSS and 2026 NDS Shift Focus to the Western Hemisphere and Indo-Pacific

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The release of the 2025 National Security Strategy (NSS) in November 2025 and the 2026 National Defense Strategy (NDS) in January 2026 marks a clear pivot in U.S. strategic priorities under the second Trump administration. These documents emphasize homeland defense, reasserting dominance in the Western Hemisphere via a “Trump Corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine, and deterring China in the Indo-Pacific through strength and balance of power—while dialing back commitments elsewhere. For Command and Control Air Battle Management (C2ABM), this reorientation has profound implications: it demands adaptation in training, resource allocation, platform posture, and the human element of airborne/ground air battle management to support a more regionally focused, burden-sharing approach.

This post examines how these strategies reshape C2ABM realities for Air Battle Managers, aligning with our site’s themes of historical lessons, cultural readiness, and the “infinite game” of training amid fractured threats.

The Strategic Shift: From Global Competition to Prioritized Hemispheres

The 2025 NSS rejects expansive post-Cold War definitions of national interest, focusing on core priorities: homeland security, Western Hemisphere preeminence, and Indo-Pacific economic/military balance. It revives the Monroe Doctrine with a “Trump Corollary,” prioritizing countering migration, drug trafficking, and foreign incursions (especially Chinese influence).

The 2026 NDS translates this into four lines of effort: defending the homeland (including Western Hemisphere enforcement), deterring China in the Indo-Pacific “through strength, not confrontation,” increasing allied burden-sharing, and revitalizing the defense industrial base. As with the 2022 NDS, Homeland Defense remains the top priority; however, the 2026 strategy diverges, emphasizing the Western Hemisphere as its focal region and the importance of preventing foreign incursion into the region and securing U.S. access to key terrain, such as the Panama Canal and Greenland. The Indo-Pacific remains among the top priorities, though the role of competition is somewhat diminished in favor of maintaining a balance of power to foster a “decent peace” in the region. Notably, the strategy explicitly ranks threats and signals resource triage. This contrasts sharply with prior strategies’ emphasis on global great-power competition (e.g., the 2022 NDS’s focus on China/Russia as “pacing threats”).

Implications for C2ABM: Regional Realignment and Human-Centric Adaptation

C2ABM—rooted in airborne platforms like AWACS and ground nodes—thrives on providing the situational awareness, decision support, and dynamic coordination needed to generate air superiority in contested environments, as outlined in recent analyses emphasizing layered air battle management. The new strategies challenge this by requiring C2ABM competencies to align with prioritized theaters:

Western Hemisphere Emphasis: The “Trump Corollary” calls for military options against narco-terrorists, border security, and denying adversary positioning in the Americas. This could redirect C2ABM resources toward southern-focused ops: enhanced radar surveillance over maritime approaches, dispersed air battle management for counter-drug missions, and integration with DHS/partner nations. Exercises may shift to scenarios involving transnational threats (e.g., cartel networks, migration flows), emphasizing human judgment in degraded environments over high-end peer-on-peer conflicts. Robins AFB’s evolving role (e.g., 728th BMCS AFCENT missions) could expand to support hemispheric C2 and build cultural resilience among Airmen for “close-to-home” operations. Moreover, this refocus on the Western Hemisphere and homeland defense necessitates the E-7 as a critical AEW&C platform to counter advanced adversarial cruise-missile capabilities, providing persistent airborne surveillance, early warning, and command to counter low-observable threats in expansive, asymmetric environments.

Indo-Pacific Deterrence: The NDS prioritizes a “strong denial defense” along the First Island Chain and maintaining balance to prevent domination. C2ABM must sustain high-tempo airborne management for air superiority, sensor fusion, and joint fires in contested maritime domains. However, the softer tone (de-escalation, no explicit focus on Taiwan) suggests a more restrained posture—fewer forward deployments and greater reliance on allies (e.g., Japan, Australia) for sustained coverage. This amplifies the “infinite game” of training: C2ABM practitioners must emphasize multi-domain integration with allies and partners, adapt to burden-sharing, and prepare for prolonged competition, where finding opportunities for de-escalation is critical.

Broader C2ABM Challenges: Global readjustments (e.g., reduced European/Middle East presence) free resources but risk overstretch in prioritized theaters. Information overload persists in contested spaces, demanding resilient human decision-making. The NDS’s industrial base focus could accelerate platform modernization (e.g., E-7 transitions), but delays underscore workforce sustainment needs—consistent with our emphasis on culture and expertise.

This pivot should also increase NORAD’s prominence and accelerate recapitalization, thereby enhancing integrated air defense against hemispheric threats, including cruise missiles and unmanned systems. Canadian investment in both ground and airborne AEW&C capabilities would be welcomed in Washington, strengthening bilateral C2ABM interoperability and shared hemispheric security.

In this context, C2ABM’s core competencies, such as building situational awareness, allocating resources dynamically, directing tactical engagements, and synchronizing joint effects, become even more critical for translating strategic priorities into operational success in these focused theaters.

Why This Matters: Sustaining the Human Edge in a Prioritized World

These documents reinforce that C2ABM remains a human domain: Air Battle Managers provide the judgment that no algorithm can replace (yet), in uncertain, high-stakes environments. The shift to a regional focus could streamline training (e.g., Bamboo Eagle-style contested operations tailored to hemispheres) but will require cultural adaptation, preparing Airmen for hemispheric missions while maintaining Indo-Pacific readiness. Over-optimism about quick pivots risks gaps; the “infinite game” demands iterative improvement. Stay tuned for the 2026 National Military Strategy (NMS) and resulting updates to Combatant Command Strategies and Campaign Plans for further clues regarding C2ABM re-orientation in the evolving strategic landscape.

Path Forward: Grounded Readiness

C2ABM leaders should advocate for exercises that blend hemispheric threats with Indo-Pacific denial, invest in AI literacy for sub-functions (without overreliance), and foster alliances to share C2 burdens. This aligns with historical lessons: effective air battle management wins when competencies are applied to vital interests.

Do you have thoughts on how these strategies will reshape daily C2ABM ops? Share your thoughts below in the comments, pen a thought-piece blog post, and join our next podcast!


Lt Col Grant “SWAT” Georgulis, USAF, is a Master Air Battle Manager and currently assigned as the Deputy Chief of C2 Inspections as part of the Headquarters NORAD and NORTHCOM Inspector General team. He most recently finished a year-long Air Force National Defense Fellowship at The Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies for the academic year 2024-2025. He entered the Air Force in 2007 through the ROTC program at Texas State University–San Marcos. Lt Col Georgulis has served on a combatant command component staff, was an Air Force Weapons School instructor, and graduated from the Naval War College’s College of Naval Command and Staff and Air University’s School of Advanced Air and Space Studies. He previously commanded an E-3G Squadron, the 965 Airborne Air Control Squadron, at Tinker Air Force Base, Oklahoma.


The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Air Force, Department of Defense, or U.S. government.


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