Introduction
In 1925, as the world teetered between wars, Brigadier General Billy Mitchell penned Winged Defense, a clarion call for airpower’s independence from ground and naval forces. “The future of our nation,” he warned, “depends upon the development of air power.” Mitchell’s vision—centralized control, strategic bombing, and air superiority as the linchpin of victory—prophesied the aerial campaigns that would define World War II. Fast-forward a century, and his words resonate amid escalating global flashpoints: Russia’s grinding war in Ukraine, Israel’s precision strikes against Hamas and Hezbollah, and China’s saber-rattling over Taiwan. In this ever-destabilizing world, where hybrid threats blur battle lines and peer adversaries like China field over 600 advanced fighters, airpower is not a luxury—it is an existential necessity. The thesis is unequivocal: By bridging the strategic insights of airpower pioneers like Mitchell and John Warden with today’s operational imperatives, the United States must revitalize its aerial dominance to deter aggression and secure peace.
Background
Historical arguments for airpower were not mere theory; they were forged in the crucible of conflict. Mitchell’s advocacy for an independent air force stemmed from World War I observations where haphazard air support squandered potential. He argued that airpower could “strike at the enemy’s vitals” directly, bypassing costly ground attrition—a concept echoed in Colonel John Warden’s 1988 The Air Campaign. Airpower’s true value lies in its strategic leverage: “It is not about killing people and breaking things, but about achieving political objectives with minimal cost.”
Yet, in the post-9/11 era of counterinsurgencies, these lessons faded. Two decades of permissive skies over Iraq and Afghanistan atrophied U.S. air battle management (ABM) capabilities—E-3 AWACS readiness rates dipped below 60%, and expertise eroded. Now, as global instability surges, airpower’s necessity snaps back into focus. In Ukraine, where drones and missiles dominate headlines, air superiority remains pivotal, yet elusive for either side. Russia’s inability to fully suppress Ukrainian defenses highlights airpower’s role in enabling ground operations, yet Ukraine’s ad hoc ABM—fusing Western radars with Soviet-era fighters—has denied Moscow total control, prolonging the stalemate. Similarly, Israel’s 2025 campaign against regional threats underscores airpower’s coercive edge. As Lt. Gen. David Deptula noted in a June 2025 Forbes article, Israel’s integrated air strikes have neutralized Iranian-backed terrorist infrastructure with minimal ground escalation, demonstrating how precision airpower achieves political goals in asymmetric wars.
The Indo-Pacific theater amplifies this urgency. China’s PLAAF, bolstered by J-20 stealth fighters and KJ-500 AEW&C platforms, poses a near-peer challenge unmatched since the Cold War. A potential Taiwan conflict could see airpower deciding the outcome: U.S. forces must overcome vast distances and integrated defenses to maintain sea lanes and deter invasion. Here, Colin S. Gray’s warnings from The Airpower Advantage in Future Warfare (2012) ring true—air assets must integrate across joint domains, including space and cyber, to counter hybrid threats.
Call to Action
Revitalizing airpower demands action rooted in history. Gen. Kenneth Wilsbach, the current Chief of Staff of the Air Force, has rightly prioritized expanding the fighter force—pledging to add nearly 100 aircraft by 2030 and accelerate programs like the F-47 and Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA) to bolster readiness against peer threats. Yet his confirmation hearing revealed a troubling divide between the Department of War (DoW) and Congress over airborne early warning and control (AEW&C): the DoW, echoing Secretary Hegseth’s concerns about costs and survivability, seeks to terminate the E-7 program without pursuing a viable alternative, while Congress has shown strong bipartisan support—allocating nearly $200 million in the November 2025 Continuing Appropriations Act to sustain rapid prototyping and transition to production—temporarily forcing the DoW’s hand to preserve this critical capability. This myopic DoW focus on fighters risks repeating Mitchell’s early critiques of unbalanced forces by neglecting AEW&C platforms that provide the “eyes in the sky” and ABM functions that enable synergistic operations both in the air and across joint domains. Without modern AEW&C to replace aging E-3s, fifth-gen fighters like the F-35 become isolated hunters, vulnerable to electronic warfare and outnumbered in contested spaces; actual air superiority demands this integrated ecosystem, as Warden’s parallel strikes illustrated.
Recent Mitchell Institute analysis underscores that reclaiming air superiority requires enhanced ABM: force allocation, data fusion, and real-time control to orchestrate fifth- and sixth-generation assets. This directly mirrors Mitchell’s call for centralized command and Warden’s parallel warfare, adapted for drones and AI. Recommendations include accelerating modern AEW&C procurement, bolstering fighter fleets by 30% as Lt Gen Deptula has urged in recent analyses, and fostering allied interoperability—applying lessons learned from NATO’s response to Russian airspace incursions.
Conclusion
In a world where authoritarian regimes test democratic resolve—from the Baltic skies to the South China Sea—airpower’s historical imperatives offer a roadmap. Neglect them, and we invite vulnerability; embrace them, and we forge deterrence. As Lt Gen Deptula recently advised the incoming administration: air and space power are the president’s premier tools for national security. Mitchell’s prophecy endures: The skies hold the key to our future. It is time to heed the past and soar.
Lt Col Grant “SWAT” Georgulis, USAF, is a Master Air Battle Manager and currently assigned as the Deputy Chief of C2 Inspections as part of the Headquarters NORAD and NORTHCOM Inspector General team. He most recently finished a year-long Air Force National Defense Fellowship at The Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies for the academic year 2024-2025. He entered the Air Force in 2007 through the ROTC program at Texas State University–San Marcos. Lt Col Georgulis has served on a combatant command component staff, was an Air Force Weapons School instructor, and graduated from the Naval War College’s College of Naval Command and Staff and Air University’s School of Advanced Air and Space Studies. He previously commanded an E-3G Squadron, the 965 Airborne Air Control Squadron, at Tinker Air Force Base, Oklahoma.
The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Air Force, Department of Defense, or U.S. government.
Photo by Sean P. Twomey on Pexels
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