Introduction – The Key West Agreement
The 1948 Key West Agreement resolved postwar interservice rivalries by assigning clear roles: the Army is responsible for land combat, including ground-based air defense to protect troops and bases, while the Air Force handles air superiority, strategic bombing, and deep strikes. Refined by the 1956 Wilson Memorandum, this framework aimed to eliminate redundancy and boost efficiency. Today, as great-power competition with China and Russia escalates, the Army’s pursuit of long-range strike systems, such as the Precision Strike Missile (PrSM), and the vague “Air Littoral” concept risks encroaching on Air Force domains. While land-based strike capabilities hold value, the Army must prioritize its critical air base defense mission to ensure joint readiness against hypersonic missiles and small unmanned aerial systems (sUAS), thereby freeing the underfunded Air Force to secure air dominance.
Mission Creep: Army Long-Range Fires
The Army’s Long-Range Precision Fires program, developing hypersonic weapons and PrSM, targets enemy air defenses and command nodes—missions the Air Force has executed since 1948 with stealth bombers and cruise missiles. Former Army Chief of Staff Gen. James McConville pitched these types of capabilities as cost-effective, citing Gulf War Apache strikes as historic evidence. Yet this overlooks the Air Force’s decisive F-117 missions and the extensive employment of Navy Tomahawk missiles, which crippled Iraqi defenses. In constrained budgets, as said by Lt Gen David Deptula, Dean of the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies, “A dollar spent on duplicative capability comes at the expense of essential capacity or capability elsewhere.”
The Army’s encroachment on Air Force missions at the expense of air defense is a strategic error, particularly against China’s DF-26 missiles, which have a 4,000-kilometer range and are capable of targeting Guam. Further, China’s 2024 exercises showcased drone swarms threatening airfields, underscoring the need for a robust Army air defense presence to protect bases like Andersen Air Force Base. Beyond China, the conflict in Ukraine highlights the potential threat posed by Russia’s Kinzhal hypersonic missiles and Orlan-10 drones, which have been used in Ukraine for swarm attacks. Ukraine’s 10,000 drone types and thousands lost monthly highlight the scale of modern air threats.
The Army’s Patriot and THAAD systems are critical for joint base protection, but funding lags as deep-strike programs dominate. Shifting air defense to the Air Force would strain its budget, which has been below 25% of the Department of Defense total since 1992, with $40 billion in annual pass-throughs for programs like the Space Force. As Lt. Gen. David Deptula and Mark Gunzinger note, adding ground defense would divert funds from B-21 bombers, F-35 fighters, and E-7 air battle management aircraft, all of which are needed to recapitalize the Air Force and secure future air superiority.
This is not to say that long-range strike systems like PrSM do not have a role to play in layered deterrence, complementing the Air Force’s and Navy’s capabilities. PrSM’s 400-mile range enables rapid, land-based strikes in contested areas, such as the Pacific, supporting joint operations without relying solely on air or sea platforms that could be employed elsewhere to exploit their inherent mobility and flexibility; however, Army deep-strike systems lack the Air Force’s stealth and flexibility, and fixed-site missiles are vulnerable to preemptive strikes. The Army should continue to explore these long-range strike capabilities, but should not pursue them at the expense of its core Key West air base defense mission. Underfunding base defense capabilities such as Patriot, Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), and other emerging air defense systems risks leaving joint bases vulnerable, undermining the platforms—Air Force jets and Navy ships—that PrSM purports to complement. Nor should these programs be transferred to the Air Force, as such programs would overburden the Air Force’s already-strained budget and dilute its rightful focus on air superiority.
New Nonsense: The Air Littoral
The Army’s “Air Littoral” concept aims to achieve dominance in low-altitude airspace (from the surface to several thousand feet) for Army aviation and small Unmanned Aerial Systems (sUAS). This redundant, fabricated “subdomain,” supposedly dominated by “drones,” blurs lines with Air Force roles like air superiority and close air support, risking confusion with naval “littoral” terminology. Lacking doctrinal clarity, it diverts resources from air defense. Proponents argue that it reflects the complexity of multi-domain warfare, as seen in Ukraine’s frustrating air and ground operations. However, air superiority, accomplished through defended airfields, solves the stalemate unfolding between Ukraine and Russia. Desert Storm showcased joint strength through specialization: Army ground forces, Air Force air dominance, and Navy sea control. Unnecessary overlap fosters friction, not synergy.
The Army’s cancellation of a $2 billion reconnaissance helicopter and rapid buy of 600 Coyote counter-UAS systems show it’s learning from Ukraine, as Army Chief of Staff Gen. Randy George noted: “Aerial reconnaissance has fundamentally changed.” The Air Littoral concept, while acknowledging UAS threats, overlaps with the Air Force and Navy air wings. The Army would be better served focusing on securing air bases in the Pacific, and allowing codified airspace management procedures to counter sUAS threats in the air, by exception.
The Future Relevance of the Army
Some argue that deep-strike and Air Littoral roles enhance Army relevance in multi-domain warfare; however, not duplicating missions already assigned to other services will allow the Army to focus on developing a solution to air base defense against evolving aerial threats. The Army’s strength lies in ground-based defense, complemented by new long-range strike capabilities like PrSM. Programs like Directed Energy Maneuver-SHORAD lasers and Patriot can counter evolving aerial threats, protecting both maneuver forces and airbases. The Navy’s Aegis destroyers and Aegis ashore can provide layered effects, securing Pacific sea lanes and island approaches, complementing Army air defense capabilities. By focusing on service-specific discrete roles rather than pursuing duplicative new capabilities, the Army can remain relevant as a critical enabler to the joint force of the future.
Conclusion
The Army must return to its Key West roots: prioritize air base defense while sustaining long-range strike development as a complementary capability. By fully funding Patriot, THAAD, SHORAD, and other emerging air defense and counter-UAS capabilities, the Army shields joint forces, thereby unburdening the Air Force to focus on air dominance. Congress and the Pentagon should redirect funds from Army long-range fires to air defense, codify roles (Army for primarily ground-based air defense and some complementary long-range strike capability, Air Force for aerial dominance), and cut redundancies. The strength of joint operations resides in the separateness of the service capabilities. With China and Russia advancing, Key West’s roles and missions optimize the joint force’s Pacific edge.
Lt Col Grant “SWAT” Georgulis, USAF, is a Master Air Battle Manager and currently assigned as the Deputy Chief of C2 Inspections as part of the Headquarters NORAD and NORTHCOM Inspector General team. He most recently finished a year-long Air Force National Defense Fellowship at The Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies for the academic year 2024-2025. He entered the Air Force in 2007 through the ROTC program at Texas State University–San Marcos. Lt Col Georgulis has served on a combatant command component staff, was an Air Force Weapons School instructor, and graduated from the Naval War College’s College of Naval Command and Staff and Air University’s School of Advanced Air and Space Studies. He previously commanded an E-3G Squadron, the 965 Airborne Air Control Squadron, at Tinker Air Force Base, Oklahoma.
The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Air Force, Department of Defense, or U.S. government.
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