The Core Distinction: Data vs. Direction
In the high-stakes arena of modern aerial warfare, the distinction between receiving data, turning it into information, and acting upon it decisively can mean the difference between victory and defeat. Yet, a troubling misconception persists within certain corridors of the Department of Defense (DOD) that Airborne Moving Target Indicator (AMTI) data, particularly that sourced from space-based platforms, can supplant the need for dedicated air battle management systems like the Boeing E-7 Airborne Early Warning and Control (AEW&C) aircraft. This fallacy overlooks a fundamental truth—space-based AMTI satellites provide data, a snapshot of moving targets in the air domain, but it requires the orchestration of air battle management to translate that data into actionable effects that can secure air superiority. As the United States grapples with near-peer adversaries like China, whose People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) boasts advanced anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities, conflating surveillance with command cannot be afforded. Relying solely on space-based AMTI data sources risks leaving US forces blind to the dynamic, human-driven decisions essential for dominating contested airspace. Instead, a layered sensing architecture—integrating space, air, and ground-based assets—must underpin robust air battle management to ensure the United States prevails in the next major conflict.
To understand this core argument, AMTI data must first be delineated from air battle management. AMTI is a radar-based technology that detects, tracks, and identifies moving airborne targets, providing critical situational awareness by distinguishing aircraft from ground clutter. Platforms like the venerable E-3 Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) have long delivered AMTI data, enabling forces to monitor enemy movements over vast areas. However, AMTI data is passive information; it does not inherently direct operations, deconflict joint fires, or integrate multi-domain inputs in real-time. Air battle management, by contrast, encompasses the active processes of force management, information management, integrated surveillance and identification, and a continuum of control. It involves highly trained personnel who interpret data, correlate it with operational objectives, and issue directives to fighters, bombers, and other assets. “Air battle management entails the real-time direction of air operations within a commander’s intent, which is distinct from command and control (C2) that provides structural authority for actions in the battlespace.” Without this human element, AMTI remains inert—a map without a navigator.
Lessons from History: Data Alone Does Not Win Wars
Historical precedents underscore this distinction. During Operation DESERT STORM in 1991, E-3 AWACS aircraft provided AMTI data via datalinks, but it was the air battle managers aboard who tasked air interdiction missions and facilitated 38 out of 41 air-to-air kills. The E-3s controlled 85 percent of all sorties—over 90,000 in total—demonstrating that air superiority was not achieved solely by data, but by orchestrating that data into coherent actions.
Similarly, in the Battle of Britain, the British Dowding System integrated radar information with human controllers to direct Spitfires and Hurricanes against the Luftwaffe, proving that information without management yields chaos, not control. “In the Battle of Britain, radar-empowered air battle management and the resolve of the RAF combat air forces over England repelled the Luftwaffe. In DESERT STORM, the same collaboration between air battle managers and coalition air assets enabled a coordinated precision-strike air campaign that yielded a decisive victory.” In today’s context, fifth-generation fighters like the F-35 and F-22 excel in stealth and sensor fusion, but pilots of a four-ship formation of fifth-generation aircraft performing counter-air actions against a near-peer cannot perform all the air battle management functions necessary to achieve air superiority. In short, AMTI informs. Air battle management acts.
The E-7 Controversy: Survivability Concerns and Space Alternatives
Today, a controversy surrounds the USAF E-7 acquisition, a modern AEW&C aircraft designed to replace the aging E-3. The E-7 features an advanced multirole electronically scanned array (MESA) radar, offering superior detection ranges, reduced vulnerability to jamming, and seamless integration with coalition and joint forces. Yet, some officials in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Cost Assessment and Program (CAPE) office argue that survivability concerns in contested environments—particularly against long-range missiles from adversaries like China—render the E-7 obsolete. They propose shifting AMTI to space-based solutions, such as constellations of low-Earth orbit satellites, claiming this negates the need for vulnerable airborne platforms. This logic, however, ignores the E-7’s dual role as both an AMTI provider and an air battle management hub, where onboard specialists turn raw data into battlefield dominance. It also ignores the fact that the proposed CAPE alternative of using the E-2D aircraft as an alternative while transitioning to space-based AMTI is even more vulnerable than the E-7. Their proposal also overlooks the fact that, over 99.99 percent of the time, the U.S. military is not engaged in peer conflict and requires airborne battle management capabilities to achieve its objectives daily.
The recent cancellation of the E-7 program, announced in the fiscal 2026 budget, is a shortsighted approach because it misses all these factors. Citing cost overruns—from $588 million to $724 million per aircraft—and survivability issues, the Air Force has opted to pivot toward space-based alternatives and additional Navy E-2D Hawkeyes. A senior military official explained, “The Department is canceling the E-7 Wedgetail program due to significant delays with cost increases from $588 million to $724 million for aircraft and survivability concerns in this contested environment, while investing in alternate solutions, including space-based capabilities and adding additional E-2D aircraft.” A critical flaw in the cost rationale is the apples-to-oranges comparison of current and future dollars. The $588 million figure reflects today’s fiscal year pricing, whereas the $724 million estimate accounts for projected costs in the mid-2030s, which are likely inflated by factors such as rising materials, labor, and economic escalation. This inconsistent metric is selectively weaponized against the E-7 program. Yet, it’s not applied to alternatives like space-based AMTI, whose own expenses would undoubtedly balloon even higher when viewed through the same future-dollar lens.
Proponents of this shift are optimistic about space, with the same official stating, “We are bullish on space, and we think that’s a capability that can be achieved actually faster than the E-7 will deliver at this point.” However, this decision has drawn sharp criticism. Sen. Lisa Murkowski questioned the rationale, noting, “We just haven’t heard, in my view, sufficient justification for the cancellation of such a critical program.” Even Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. David Allvin called it a “difficult decision,” underscoring the internal tensions.
Criticisms and Vulnerabilities: Space is Not a Panacea
Critics, including retired Lt. Gen. David Deptula, argue that canceling the E-7 is a strategic blunder. Deptula emphasizes that space-based AMTI, while promising, cannot replicate the comprehensive air battle management provided by the E-7. He warns, “Even with a fully functioning space-based AMTI enterprise, there are limitations inherent with a space-based only solution.” Furthermore, “Future space-based AMTI concepts have yet to define where and how air battle managers integrate into the overarching mission. Thus far, the effort has been focused on technical solutions. That is only half the equation.” In actuality, the “where” is known. Space-sourced AMTI data should be piped into air battle management nodes on the ground and in the air, such as the USAF’s Control and Reporting Center (CRC), NORAD and NORTHCOM air defense Sectors, the new battlefield control centers (BCCs), and the E-7, as redundancies to organic radar capability. The E-2D, proposed as a partial alternative, falls short due to its smaller crew, limited radios, and limited radar range, rendering it inadequate for theater-wide air battle management operations against near-peer adversaries—not to mention its even greater vulnerably to advanced missile threats than the E-7 due to its lower altitude operations, slower speed, and need to fly closer to adversaries to acquire necessary data.
Senior Air Force leaders and retired statesmen have rallied against the cancellation, highlighting the E-7’s indispensability. At a Mitchell Institute event, retired Gen. Kevin Chilton, the former head of Air Force Space Command, highlighted the vulnerabilities of space assets themselves. He stated, “We have to remember that the space domain today is … arguably more vulnerable than any other domains,” and added, “Now we’re saying we’re going to throw AMTI into space. Well, maybe we will one day, but the challenges there are quite difficult.” Chilton also warned of catastrophic risks, noting, “The entire low-Earth orbit constellation that we’re looking at putting up sure is vulnerable to a nuclear detonation in space, which is why we’re so concerned.” Former Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. T. Michael Moseley echoed this, describing space as “a contested combat arena” with “an inability to protect” satellites. These voices underscore that survivability is not unique to airborne platforms; space is equally, if not more, exposed to anti-satellite weapons, jamming, and cyber-attacks from adversaries like China and Russia.
Moreover, the E-7 complements other assets, including the F-35, F-22, and recently announced F-47, in achieving air superiority. Gen. John Loh, former Vice Chief of Staff, dismissed the idea of disaggregating air battle management across fighters and satellites without a dedicated platform, saying, “There may be aggregation in the future. But we’re talking about something we need to do today.” Lt. Gen. Deptula reinforced this, explaining that air battle management “requires highly trained personnel to be able to interpret that data and then correlate it into action in accordance with the operational and tactical objectives.” The F-35’s advanced sensors are invaluable, but overburdening pilots with air battle management duties dilutes their combat effectiveness.
Advocating for Layered Sensing: A Multi-Domain Approach
Active-duty senior Defense officials—even those from the Space Force—advocate for a diverse, layered target-tracking architecture rather than a monolithic space-based solution. Lt. Gen. Shawn Bratton, deputy chief of space operations, supports synergies between domains, stating, “We think there are kind of synergies of having both flavors of this capability right now, but we’re really waiting for some just hard engineering data to understand what we can see from space, and how good is that going to be.” Current Air Force Chief, Gen. David Allvin, has acknowledged that satellites are not yet ready to assume full AMTI responsibilities, while Gen. Gregory Guillot, commander of U.S. Northern Command, calls for a “seabed-to-space approach” with a “domain awareness layer.” Former Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall highlighted technical hurdles, noting, “We’re trying to get a lot of that functionality into space, but that’s going to take a while, and there’s some technical challenges with that,” and stressed urgency for the E-7: “There’s a pretty high sense of urgency about getting [the E-7] fielded.” This layered strategy—combining space for persistent coverage, air for flexible management, and ground for resilient backup—ensures redundancy and adaptability.
Counterargument: Why a Single-Domain, Space-Based Solution Fails to Achieve Air Superiority
Proponents of a space-only AMTI paradigm argue it offers survivability and cost savings by removing vulnerable aircraft from the equation. However, this approach is fatally flawed and insufficient to win the next major conflict. First, space assets are inherently vulnerable themselves. Adversaries like China possess sophisticated ASAT weapons, capable of kinetic strikes, lasers, or electronic warfare that could blind or destroy satellite constellations in hours. A single nuclear detonation in low-Earth orbit, in addition to disabling electromagnetic pulse (EMP), could also cascade debris, rendering vast swaths of space unusable—a scenario Chilton describes as devastating.
Second, space-based AMTI lacks the real-time, human-integrated air battle management essential for dynamic warfare. Satellites provide data, but without air battle managers to deconflict, prioritize, and direct, that data alone is useless. In a Taiwan Strait scenario, where PLAAF AEW&C outnumbers US assets, space-based AMTI alone would cede initiative, allowing enemies to exploit gaps. Deptula asserts, “The reality is that combatant commanders require reliable AEW&C solutions today. It comes down to assuring air superiority capability at sufficient capacity to deter conflict. Failing deterrence, we must ensure that we can fight and win.” Chief of Space Operations Gen. Chance Saltzman admits, “No one system is going to be perfectly optimized to take care of the full spectrum of ops. And so that’s where I think you need a mix of systems.”
Third, timelines don’t align with threats. Space capabilities won’t mature until the early 2030s, according to Gen. Saltzman, leaving a decade-long gap during which adversaries can further advance the current AEW&C platform gap. Others believe that date will extend well beyond the 2030s. The E-7 bridges the timeframe to get to a viable space-based AMTI system. It is also needed now to support initiatives such as Golden Dome for cruise missile defense, small unmanned aerial systems defense, and aerospace warning and control, as Gen. Guillot testified: the E-7’s AMTI capability is “essential to layered defense against these potential threats.” A space-only strategy invites deterrence failure, as history shows air superiority demands integrated, not isolated, domains.
Conclusion: Reclaiming the Skies Through Holistic Strategy
Indeed, AMTI is not air battle management—it’s the raw material that skilled air battle managers shape into victory. Canceling the E-7 in favor of unproven space solutions is a gamble the US cannot afford. Congress and the DOD must reverse course, accelerating E-7 acquisition while developing layered sensing capabilities. Only through this holistic approach can the US reclaim the skies and secure air superiority in future conflicts. The alternative—data without direction—is a recipe for defeat.
Lt Col Grant “SWAT” Georgulis, USAF, is a Master Air Battle Manager and currently assigned as the Deputy Chief of C2 Inspections as part of the Headquarters NORAD and NORTHCOM Inspector General team. He most recently finished a year-long Air Force National Defense Fellowship at The Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies for the academic year 2024-2025. He entered the Air Force in 2007 through the ROTC program at Texas State University–San Marcos. Lt Col Georgulis has served on a combatant command component staff, was an Air Force Weapons School instructor, and graduated from the Naval War College’s College of Naval Command and Staff and Air University’s School of Advanced Air and Space Studies. He previously commanded an E-3G Squadron, the 965 Airborne Air Control Squadron, at Tinker Air Force Base, Oklahoma.
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, or Department of the Air Force.
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