Introduction
The future of U.S. Air Force airborne command and control should not depend on the success or failure of a single acquisition program. The E-7 remains an important capability and should continue to be pursued, but its high cost, slow procurement timeline, and vulnerability to changing fiscal and political priorities make an E-7-only approach increasingly risky. The Air Force should therefore pursue a complementary, lower-cost airborne early warning and control capability that can be fielded rapidly and in greater numbers alongside the E-7. This approach would preserve an airborne C2ABM layer if the E-7 program is curtailed, increase the number and geographic distribution of available platforms, and make the broader AEW&C force more resilient to future budgetary tradeoffs. This post examines the fiscal and political risks facing the E-7, considers the limitations of messaging and a transition away from airborne C2ABM as alternative solutions, and argues that a high-low mix offers the most practical path to preserving airborne C2ABM capacity over the long term.
Future Airborne C2
The E-7 program faces a serious risk of being discontinued before delivering its planned 26-aircraft fleet, a number that itself may prove insufficient to meet global demand. Because the E-7 remains the only currently contemplated replacement for the aging E-3, early curtailment would create a significant gap in U.S. Air Force AEW&C capacity.
The principal obstacle to the E-7 program’s continued existence is the high per-unit cost of each aircraft, currently estimated between $588 and $724 million per unit, which leads to slow delivery timelines, budgetary challenges from within the Air Force and the greater Department, and unsteady political support for continued appropriations. Solving the underlying problem – the price – is unlikely, especially as U.S. allies opt for other-than-E-7 solutions to their AEW&C needs, foreclosing the possibility of a wide consumer base that might defray costs.
The high costs and slow delivery timelines will require the E-7 to retain significant support from within and without the Department over multiple administrations and congresses. In an environment of constrained resources, such as the defense budget or appropriation, it can be very enticing to cut an expensive platform, as the opportunity cost of producing such a platform is so high. As examples, a single E-7 carries an opportunity cost of 7 to 9 F-35As or 1.5 to 2 LSMs. Maintaining support for programs of this scale over long periods has been problematic in the past, as evidenced by the early curtailment of the costly B-1, B-2, and F-22 programs, among others. As such, it is reasonable to suspect that the same fate might befall the E-7, unless it maintains strong departmental and congressional support.
Departmental support has already proven to be limited, as the Department opted to cancel the E-7 program before it even truly began, and reversed its decision only when the budget request was expanded significantly and constrained resources, or “austerity,” were no longer as pressing a concern. During the intervening period, Congress stepped in to support the E-7 and provided appropriations to continue its development despite the lack of interest from the Department. This support was made possible in part because Rep. Tom Cole (R-OK), whose district includes the principal hub of the U.S. Air Force’s AEW&C force, serves as the Chair of the House Appropriations Committee.
These sanguine conditions of resource abundance and powerful congressional supporters are unlikely to continue, as the $1.5 trillion budget request is frequently described as a “once in a generation” investment into the defense apparatus, and the House of Representatives will likely “flip” to become a Democrat-majority organization during the upcoming 120th Congress – this said without regard or comment on the current political climate; simply as the most likely outcome based on trend data that shows that House majorities nearly always lose seats to the minority in midterm elections, and the understanding that the current House majority is already quite slim. In this scenario, the government will be divided, preventing the use of reconciliation as a funding vehicle, increasing the likelihood of disagreement between the House and Senate forcing additional longer-term continuing resolutions that will further delay the program, and Rep. Cole may lose his position atop the House Appropriations Committee, reducing his influence on big-ticket appropriations items. Taken together, this indicates that the E-7 program faces challenging headwinds, and it should not be assumed that the program will be sustained long enough to reach its planned 26-aircraft conclusion.
Paths Ahead
Messaging for the E-7
In light of the reality described above, it is natural to search for solutions that might prevent a significant AEW&C and broader C2ABM gap in the near future. C2ABM advocates generally believe that the need for an airborne C2ABM layer is serious, obvious, and compelling, and this belief can inspire some to look at messaging as the key challenge. Effectively, this approach assumes that the issue is that decision makers are not hearing the right message or that the message is diluted, and further assumes something to the effect of if only the community could unify behind a consistent message and find the proper way to word the argument, national-level decision makers will come to understand how important it is and the E-7 program will be sustained on its obvious merits.
Messaging solutions are widely appealing, because focusing on messaging allows interested parties to retain their beliefs in obvious merits of their chosen issue, and further to believe that if the issue were properly understood that there could be no room for legitimate disagreement or de-prioritization – the only work remaining work is to convince those less in-the-know so that they may join the cause. Unfortunately, the challenges facing the E-7 program go beyond messaging. Instead, the E-7 was, and likely will someday again be, targeted for cancellation because of resource scarcity and the unpleasant reality of tradeoffs. It is quite possible that the message is clear and understood, and that leaders at the highest levels are acutely aware of the limitations of the current E-3 fleet and fully understand the capabilities that an E-7 will provide, yet, when considering the larger defense-wide picture, they still determine that cutting the E-7 is a regrettable but practical decision that will free up resources for some other program or series of programs.
Still, messaging is not for nothing – it is important to continue to provide compelling advocacy for the AEW&C mission and to highlight the risks that a gap in this mission set might incur. If this is not understood, the E-7 might be more easily traded away in the future. Messaging can take many forms, including the publishing of compelling pieces through outlets like Breaking Defense, think tanks such as The Mitchell Institute, or, of course, through blogs such as C2 Coord. This sort of messaging is welcome, to be sure, but messaging alone will likely not ensure a bright future for AEW&C as messaging itself does nothing to reduce the high per-unit cost of the E-7 that underlies the challenges facing the program.
Transition Away from Airborne C2ABM
Another approach that could be taken to ensure future C2ABM would be to transition away from airborne C2ABM altogether and instead to direct resources toward terrestrial and/or space-based solutions. This approach completely negates the high per-unit cost of the E-7 by eliminating the cost (and capability) altogether. This was, until recently, the approach being pursued by the Department as it moved to cancel the E-7 after divesting 15 E-3s. Such an approach is underpinned by a perception that AEW&C is no longer useful against a modern adversary, and that investment in emerging technologies such as AI-led C2ABM or space-based systems will provide a better product to the warfighter in a future conflict.
This is not an approach that is endorsed by this post, and so it will not be further contemplated here; however, if you share the perceptions above and believe this to be a preferred path, you are encouraged to write about it. C2 Coord will happily post it to enable all sides of the issue to be well explored.
Pursue a Plan B (or Plan 1a):
This approach involves pursuing, beginning immediately, an alternative AEW&C capability to the E-7. This alternative capability must, above all else, have a low per-unit cost and be able to be delivered rapidly in larger numbers. This approach does involve abandoning the E-7 program; instead, it advocates for an “and” or “and then” approach, wherein the alternative capability is fielded alongside a number of E-7s but is less susceptible to cancellation over budgetary concerns.
In-production platforms, such as the L3Harris AERIS, could be used to reduce initial costs and to speed RDT&E and procurement timelines. While exact per-unit costs for a hypothetical U.S. Air Force-procured AERIS aircraft is an unknowable at this stage, South Korea’s recent AEW&C replacement experience showed the AERIS to cost approximately 50% of what a new ROK-variant of the E-7 was to cost. This should be the high-end limit of what the U.S. Air Force should be willing to spend on an alternative lower-tier AEW&C capability, ideally targeting a price point nearer 30% the cost of an E-7.
The key requirement to consider is per-unit cost, even above requirements that are taken for granted, yet add significant cost, such as aerial refueling capability or simultaneous 360-degree radar coverage. This approach is pragmatic and principally seeks to ensure that a replacement AEW&C program continues well into the future, with less regard for what exactly the capability is than for the mere fact that the capability exists. It accepts compromises to ensure program survival, rather than insisting on exquisite capabilities that may increase risk of getting nothing at all.
A less expensive platform is more likely to be continued during periods of fiscal constraint, as small cuts to the program can be taken while capability continues to be delivered. While cuts to AEW&C could be made to unlock resources for any number of requirements across the joint force, consider a hypothetical example of F-35s being the under-resourced platform (unlikely, perhaps, but the underlying concept is sound regardless of the specific platform used in the example), in which procuring an E-7 comes at an opportunity cost of 7-9 F-35s, whereas the lower-tier AEW&C capability comes at a cost of only 2-3. It is likely more palatable to reduce the annual buy of F-35s from 160 to 155 to offset the procurement of 3x lower-tier AEW&C platforms than it is to cut from 160 to 144 F-35s to offset the procurement of only 2x E-7s. This example is intended to demonstrate how the question is not simply about the capabilities of the E-7 vis-à-vis other comparable C2 platforms; when considering the complete budget, the question is about total military capability gained per dollar. An E-7 may be a force multiplier, but are 7x E-7s, as are currently programmed, more of a boon than the 56+ F-35s (or plug in your own preferred trade off platform) that could have been procured in their place?
These less expensive AEW&C platforms may be less capable than the E-7 individually, perhaps significantly so, but should be equally reliable, effective at providing tailorable airborne C2ABM, and operated by dedicated C2ABM professionals who can bring the capabilities of the platform to bear anywhere in the world without reliance on deniable over-the-horizon data or communications tethers. A combined fleet of high-end AEW&C platforms (i.e., E-7s) and lower-end platforms such as the AERIS is likely a superior outcome than fielding only E-7s, even if 26 E-7s are ultimately procured. Such a fleet would allow commanders to match platform capability to required effects, rather than employ their most capable and expensive aircraft for every AEW&C mission. E-7s could be prioritized for missions requiring greater sensor performance, battle management capacity, endurance, or integration in complex contested environments, while a lower-cost platform could execute missions where those capabilities are unnecessary. Routine operations supporting homeland defense missions or operations in relatively permissive threat environments could present opportunities to preserve E-7 capacity so it may be employed where it is most required.
There are surely other benefits to employing larger numbers of smaller (albeit less capable) platforms in complement to more exquisite high-demand/low-density counterparts, but the purpose of this piece is simply to describe how layering a smaller, cheaper, and more plentiful platform into the AEW&C architecture is more likely to ultimately lead to a combat-capable AEW&C force than pursuing the E-7 alone.
Conclusion
The choice should therefore not be framed as E-7 or an alternative. The Air Force should continue pursuing the E-7 while rapidly developing a complementary, lower-cost AEW&C platform that can be purchased in greater numbers and survive future periods of fiscal constraint. Such a high-low approach accepts some platform-level compromise in exchange for greater capacity, programmatic resilience, and a higher probability that airborne C2ABM remains available to the joint force. The objective should not be to procure the most exquisite AEW&C platform possible at any cost; it should be to build an airborne C2ABM force the nation can afford to field, sustain, and employ at the scale future conflict will demand.
Lt Col Douglas “Opie” Foulk, USAF, is a Senior Air Battle Manager, currently on staff as a Legislative Affairs Officer at the United Stated Indo-Pacific Command. He previously served in various positions across multiple E-3G AWACS squadrons.
The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Air Force, Department of Defense, or U.S. government.
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